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Abstract 
 
Holmgren E. 2006. Forest Commons in Boreal Sweden – Influences on Forest Condition, 
Management and the Local Economy. 
Licentiate dissertation.  
ISBN 91-576-6893-0, ISSN 1401-0070, ISRN SLU-SRG--R--18--SE. 
 
This thesis examines the influences of Swedish forest commons on forest condition, 
management and the local economy. The approach is rationalistic, i.e. outcomes of forestry 
activities are assessed in relation to aims. According to the stated objectives, forest 
commons should serve as exemplars for improved forest management, focusing on 
increased and sustained timber production. They should provide sustainable economic 
support for farmers and the local economy, providing a sound basis for taxation and helping 
to secure the continued existence of the independent farming community. The aims of this 
thesis were: (i) to compare, regionally, the state of forests under common and other types of 
ownership; (ii) to compare forest common shareholders with non-shareholders with respect 
to the harvesting intensity and related business activities on their individually managed 
forest properties, including consideration of taxes paid to the local municipality; and (iii) to 
discuss research findings regarding the extent to which the aims of the Swedish forest 
commons (and, in a broader context, of forest common property regimes) have been 
fulfilled.  
 
In the first study, the state of the forests comprising all 33 forest commons were assessed, 
using National Forest Inventory data, and compared to other forests within the same 
municipalities. A second survey was conducted in the form of a case study with data from a 
single municipality relating to: forestry production parameters, sales revenues, operating 
costs and investments, disposable income and local municipal tax revenues. Results 
highlighted examples where the original aims of the forest commons have been realized to 
only a limited extent. For instance, the state of the forests in Norrbotten and Västerbotten 
revealed a comparatively restrictive harvesting policy. Results from the case study showed 
that shareholders’ land was less intensively managed than non-shareholders’ land. Both 
harvesting quotas and sales accounts confirmed this general finding. Shareholders also 
contributed less to the local economy through taxes. Since there were no indications that the 
potential to undertake forestry activities substantially differed between the different types of 
owners and property regimes, the differences in management intensity seem to be at least 
partially due to differences between the institutional frameworks in which they operate. 
 
The results clearly suggest that it is important to match a property regime with the owners’ 
aims for their properties. It is possible that the Swedish forest commons fulfil aims other 
than those studied, e.g. enhancing local well-being, providing ecological or amenity 
services, or promoting synergies between primary production and other rural activities, but 
these aspects require further investigation.  
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Introduction 
Ownership and Property Rights 
Two types of bodies own forest land: public bodies or governments, and private 
entities. The first group includes the sovereign state and the regional and local 
government authorities, while the second group includes both corporate bodies 
and individuals (McKean 2000, Berge 2002). Ownership is associated with 
property rights which, according to Ostrom (2000, p 332), are ‘an enforceable 
authority to undertake particular actions in specific domains’. These property 
rights imply; the rights of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and 
alienation on a cumulative scale moving from the minimal  to full ownership 
rights. Further, these rights, and the resources to which they are connected, can be 
held by single individuals, collectives or public bodies. Thus, natural resources 
have often been classified, in terms of their ownership, as private, common or state 
property. However, Ostrom (2000) and Berge (2002) argue that the key issue is 
not who owns the property, but how the package of property rights is held, for 
example how the decision-making powers are distributed, the aims of ownership, 
and the procedures for exchange of the property. 
 
The Framework of ‘Commons’  
There is worldwide engagement within the framework of ‘commons’, which deals 
with issues such as property rights, resource management and governance i.e. 
property regimes. This engagement is mirrored in the increasing interest in, and 
amount of research conducted on ‘commons’, covering a wide range of aspects of 
different types of public or private goods, rights and owners. According to Dolšak 
and Ostrom (2003), this interest in common-pool resources is highly relevant and 
will continue, as long as humans continue to rely on water, air, and the 
atmosphere, to be a core resource type, of major significance. In addition, it 
appears that the number of common-property institutions is increasing over time, 
and thus, should not be regarded as a ‘quaint relics of a hunter-gatherer or 
medieval past’ (McKean 2000 p.35). If the factors and conditions that lead to 
successful regimes can be identified, common-property regimes may be 
appropriate ways of managing common-pool resources.  
 
Nevertheless, ever since Hardin published ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ in 
1968, many people have wrongly associated ‘commons’ or ‘common property’ 
with open access and over exploitation of natural resources. This well-known 
article, which presented a model for resource governance, showed that in a 
situation of open access (assuming that all people aim for maximum profit), 
destruction of natural resources is inevitable. However, from the literature 
(Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 1975, McKean 2000, Ostrom 2000, Berge 2002) we 
learn that what Hardin described in the cited paper as ‘commons’ should, rather, 
be called open-access resources, non-properties or unmanaged common-pool 
resources, i.e. a type of resource with open access that no one has the legal right to 
exclude anyone else from using. In a review of the original article, Hardin (1998)   8
also regretted that he had failed to distinguish between the resources themselves 
and the management regimes. This important mistake has also been noted by 
Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975) and Berge (2003), amongst others. McKean 
(2000) defines common-pool resources as ‘resources that can be kept from 
potential users only at great cost or with difficulty but that are subtractable in 
consumption and can thus disappear’ (McKean 2000 p.28). In contrast, a common 
property is a property where access is limited to a specific group of users who hold 
their rights in common (Runge 1981, Bromley and Cernea 1989, McKean 2000).  
 
Berge (2002 p.3) states that commons are regimes or ‘social institutions for 
managing and distributing benefits from resources held jointly or in common’. In a 
jointly owned common, the ownership is linked to the place and the person, so the 
right cannot be transferred to descendants or taken with you if you leave the 
community (Berge 2003). In a common owned in common, the owners hold shares 
in the common property which can be transferred to descendants and also kept 
after the shareholder has moved away from the community. 
 
One advantage of establishing common property regimes is that they meet the 
need for management of a resource when open access or non-management 
threatens to deplete it. At the same time it offers a way of privatizing the rights to 
goods without sub-dividing them. There might be situations when parcelling out a 
resource is impossible or undesirable e.g. many natural resource systems are far 
more productive when left intact than when sub-divided (McKean 2000). Keeping 
ownership in the hands of a collective, instead of individually, is, according to 
Berge (2003), preferable when the desired outcome focuses on shared benefits. 
Similarly the system is also useful: if there is a need to solve collective action 
problems and develop synergies between primary production and other rural 
activities; when exclusion of appropriators is necessary; or when a ‘safety net’ for 
the poor and for new generations is required. In contrast, most economists 
consider individual ownership an essential aspect of economic development 
because it putatively provides, for example, greater incentives for the individual 
owner in comparison to those for owners of common properties (Ostrom 2000). 
Further, according to Ostrom (2000), many economists believe that collective 
ownership compared to individual ownership, involves three sources of 
inefficiency: higher transaction costs, higher enforcement costs and rent 
dissipation.  
 
Successful Common-property Regime Characteristics 
From case studies based in different parts of the world, some general 
characteristics of successful common-property regimes have been identified. In 
1990 Ostrom published an influential book in which she considered the problem 
of collective management of shared resources. Although she insists that each 
common needs to be examined individually, she delineates a set of eight ‘general’ 
design principles or recommendations for successful commons. McKean (2000) 
has combined these with her own and other researchers’ findings to produce a set 
of recommendations for successful common-property regimes. Examples of these 
include: the importance of clearly defined boundaries; that managers should be   9 
either resource users or accountable to them; and the need for mechanisms to alter 
the rules and quickly resolve minor conflicts that are dominated by the users 
themselves. Further, common-property regimes will be more effective if the user 
groups are allowed to organize themselves without external interference. If the 
management institutions are very large, they need to be hierarchical, with 
considerable devolution of authority to the lower levels. In addition, it is believed 
that common-property regimes work best when established in areas where the 
users are already used to cooperating with each other and where there are few 
conflicts. Institutional overlap and administrative support are also considered to be 
advantageous. Financial support, in contrast, appears to restrict local cooperation 
and is, therefore, not beneficial. In addition, Olson (1965) argues that the size of 
the group is important and it is likely that, above a certain level, success and size 
are negatively correlated.  
 
Not surprisingly there are differing views on what types of ownership, property 
regime or property rights are ‘best’ and in practice it probably depends on the 
purpose and will vary for each setting. Through studying different commons, 
however, we may gain insights into their dynamics, the purposes for which they 
are suited and under what conditions they perform successfully. These insights 
will add to our knowledge and inform empirically based decisions, for example 
when establishing new forest commons or adjusting the management of a resource 
to account for new functions or changed conditions.  
 
In his opening address at the IX World Conference of the International 
Association for the Study of Common Property, Berge (2002) stressed the 
importance of conducting more research on commons in Western Europe, and the 
need to consider perspectives other than historical and legal history. He argued 
that comparative studies of a variety of commons, in a variety of settings, would 
be an efficient strategy for increasing our knowledge. In addition, it is important to 
study both successful and unsuccessful cases in order to understand what factors 
lead to the development of local institutions that successfully enhance forest 
conditions (Gibson, McKean, Ostrom et. al. 2000). For this purpose, as pointed 
out by Carlsson (1995), the Swedish forest commons that were established in 
Northern Sweden between 1861 and 1918 provide excellent opportunities.  
 
Establishment and Features of Swedish Forest Commons 
The interior of Northern Sweden was considered unclaimed property until the end 
of the medieval period, when the Crown realized its value and claimed it. 
Colonization of the land was encouraged for various reasons, including to 
populate the area, to increase the total area of farmland and to raise the tax 
revenues paid to the Crown (Stenman 1983). Thus, it was necessary to establish 
boundaries. Each farm was allocated some forest land, and the total area awarded 
to each farmer was primarily based on the extent of their arable land and its 
productivity, as well as the quality of the forests. By the mid-19
th century the 
interior of the counties of Västerbotten, Norrbotten, Kopparberg and Gävleborg 
remained unallocated (Pettersson, 2003, Stenman, 1983). In connection with the 
finalization of the Great Redistribution of Land Holdings in the counties of   10
Kopparberg
1 and Gävleborg, and the delimitation process
2 in the counties of 
Västerbotten and Norrbotten, 33 forest commons were established by designating 
a proportion of each owner’s allocated forestland to be managed jointly (SFS 
1952). Thus, Swedish forest commons are owned in common and managed by 
shareholders who also own other forest holdings on an individual basis.   
 
The establishment of the Swedish forest commons began in 1861 in the counties 
of Kopparberg and Gävleborg. The last common areas were established 57 years 
later in Västerbotten (Liljenäs 1982, Carlsson 1995). During this period, many 
changes occurred in the general political conditions and forest legislation. At the 
same time, the forest industry underwent a period of economic and industrial 
development, whilst the authorities increased restrictions concerning the sharing of 
benefits from the land tenure reform. This was particularly true for the inner parts 
of Västerbotten and Norrbotten, where the 1866 regulations
3 ( SFS 1866) 
concerning the disposal of forests, and the Revised delimitation regulations for 
Lapland in Västerbotten and Norrbotten from 1873 (SFS 1873), reduced the size 
of the forestland allocated to the farmers and abolished the free right of disposal of 
the forests (Arell 1979, Enander 2003). Trees could only be felled after permission 
from a forest official. This made the forests less attractive to sawmill owners and 
farmers. In contrast, the law still permitted the sale of farms or cutting rights, thus 
providing forest companies speculative opportunities. The sawmill companies 
actively bought private forestland and cutting rights in the period from the late 
1880s to 1900 (Arell 1979). 
 
The Swedish forest commons are private forest holdings owned in common and 
managed jointly. Thus, the owners hold shares in the commons which can be 
transferred to descendants or sold, but only in association with the private estate. 
Further, the property rights can be retained after the shareholder has moved away 
from the community (Berge 2002). Consequently, the number of owners has 
increased considerably since the commons were originally formed and many 
owners are now non-residents. Today there are about 25 000 shareholders 
(Carlsson 1999) of approximately 540 000 ha of productive forestland constituting 
the forest commons (Table 1). The owners range from private individuals to forest 
companies and public institutions, although individual ownership generally 
dominates. In total, a significant proportion (22%) of the forest commons is owned 
by forest companies and 2% are owners other than individual farmers or non-
industrial forest owners (NIPF owners). Of the remaining 410 000 ha belonging to 
NIPF owners, 46% is owned by non-residents. Thus, a minor proportion of the 
commons is in the hands of local individuals. However, the ownership conditions 
vary greatly between the different commons and counties. In the counties of 
Gävleborg, Kopparberg and Norrbotten, the proportion of forest commons owned 
by companies is 24-26%, compared to 6% in Västerbotten. The low proportion of 
forest company ownership in Västerbotten is probably partly due to these 
                                                 
1 The county name was changed to Dalarna on 1
st January 1997.   
2  The delimitation process was a reform in which property rights and the boundaries between Crown 
land (essentially state-owned land) and private land were established (Stenman 1983). 
3 This law restricting the free distribution of the forests expired in 1949 (Arell 1979).   11 
commons being established after 1906, the year which saw the introduction of 
‘Norrländska bolagsförbudslagen’ ( SFS 1906a). This law prevented the 
acquisition of forestland by forest companies and economic cooperatives. The 
result has been that the extent of the forest companies’ forest ownership has 
remained unchanged in Norrland since the law was introduced. Thus, the 
efficiency of the forest commons in preventing purchase by forest companies 
seems not to have been successful.  
 
All forest commons are controlled by the same national laws and regulations, 
including the Swedish Forestry Act (SFS 1993), which regulates the management 
of Swedish forests. However, their formal organization and activities are regulated 
by a specific law, the Forest Commons Law (SFS 1952). Each forest common also 
has its own set of by-laws, authorized by the County Administration, which 
regulates the direct management of the common (Carlsson 1995). Management is 
performed jointly through elected boards and executed by professional foresters. 
The shareholders’ rights with respect to decision-making are, in general, 
proportional to the size of their share. The Forest Commons Law (SFS 1952) and 
some of the by-laws, however, contain provisions designed to limit the dominance 
of the larger landowners. Associated with ownership there are hunting and fishing 
rights.  
 
From the second half of the 19
th century, forest management was mainly the 
province of the Swedish Forest Service (Domänverket). The Forest Service 
controlled the nature of the forests; management practices in the state-owned 
forests often informed the activities of other forest owners
4 (Enander 2000). In 
1934, the supervision of the management of the forests was handed over to the 
County Forest Boards. Gradually, the authorities’ control over the commons 
decreased, and as a result of the Forest Commons Law (SFS 1952) they achieved 
the independence they have today.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Until the end of the 1940s, the most commonly used management method was ‘exploitation forestry’ 
or ‘high-grading’ of forests. Such management regimes often created open, low productivity forests 
(Enander 2001). This management strategy changed around 1950, moving to a system involving final 
felling, soil scarification, planting, pre-commercial- and commercial thinning, thereby transforming 
large areas into young even-aged forests dominated by pine and spruce. The forest policy applied by the 
forestry sector since the 1950s aims to ensure sustainable timber production (including environmental 
considerations) at a high and even volume level over a specified rotation period. Therefore an even age- 
and maturity class distribution is sought (op. cit.).    12
Table 1. Year of establishment of Swedish forest commons, their size and the proportions 
held by forest companies, NIPF owners, and others in 1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The number of forest commons varies between sources, depending on how they are divided up. For 
example, the forest common of Särna-Idre could be considered either one or two entities. This has, 
however, no implications for this thesis. 
2  Source; Liljenäs 1982. 
3  Source; Carlsson 1995 p. 13. 
4 This figure, used by Carlsson, is deviant from the one registered by the tax authorities (1994),  where 
TSA is registered to have 38 234 ha of productive forestland. 
 
NIPF owners 
 
Forest 
commons
1 
Established
 
(year)
 2 
Total 
area 
prod.  
forest- 
land  
(ha) 
3 
Forest 
company 
ha (%)
3  ha (%)
3 Fraction 
Non-
resident  
(%)
3 
Others 
ha (%)
3 
Counties of 
Gävleborg and 
Kopparberg   1861-1894  215 526  56 086 (26)  153 290 (71)  62  6 150 (3) 
Enviken  1861  2 168  542 (25)  1 474 (68)  30  43 (2) 
Hamra  1879  5 038  1 108 (22)  2 066 (41)  60  856 (17) 
Lima  1870  32 532  4880 (15)  24 399 (75)   20  3 253 (10) 
Norra Venjan  1861, 1894?  8 756  788 (9)  7 968 (91)  20  0 
Orsa  1879  55 482  10 542 (19)  44 386 (80)  63  555 (1) 
Svärdsjö-
Svartnäs  1861  4 300  860 (20)  3 440 (80)  20  0 
Särna-Idre  1879  29 417  15 003 (51)  14 414 (49)  50  0 
Södra Venjan  1861, 1894  9 500  570 (6)  8 930 (94)  50  0 
Transtrand  1870  19 000  7 980 (42)  10 070 (53)  20  950 (5) 
Älvdalen  1885  49333  13813 (28)  35 026 (71)  50  493 (1) 
            
County of 
Västerbotten  1916-1918  90 736   5 284 (6)  85 370  (94)  44  82 (0) 
Dorotea övre  1916  2 736  2 134 (78)  520 (19)  5  82 (3) 
Sorsele övre  1916  20 000  2 800 (14)  17 200 (86)  60  0 
Tärna-Stensele 1918  33  000
4  0 (0)  33 000 (100)  25  0 
Vilhelmina 
övre  1918  35 000    350 (1)  34 650 (99)  50  0 
            
County of 
Norrbotten 
1876-1894 
(excl. 
nybyggesallmän
ningar)  230 384  54 169 (24)  171 009 (74)  32  5 288 (2) 
Arjeplog  1889  22 401  4 480 (20)  17 921 (80)  18  0 
Arjeplog 
nybyggesallm.    5 581  0  5 581 (100)  5  0 
Arvidsjaur  1877  22 692  3 404 (15)  19 288 (85)  35  0 
Gällivare  1883  44 748  12 529 (28)  32 219 (72)  20  0 
Gällivare 
nybyggesallm.    527  184 (35)  343 (65)  5  0 
Jokkmokk  1889  58 000  29 000 (50)  29 000 (50)  34  0 
Jokkmokks 
nybyggesallm.    844  0  675 (80)  35  169 (20) 
Jukkasjärvi  1893  27598  276 (1)  27 322 (99)  7  0 
Karesuando  1894  5 037  0  0  0  5 037 (100) 
Pajala  1876  42 956  4 296 (10)  38 660 (90)  26  0 
           
Total    536 646  115 539 (22)  409 669 (76)  46  11 520 (2) 
   13 
The most important source of income from the forest commons is from the sale of 
standing or harvested timber. However, some of the forest commons
5 run 
subsidiary companies e.g. selling hydroelectric power or processed timber 
products. The forest commons also hold savings in funds (Ministry of Agriculture 
1983).  
 
The Swedish Forest Commons – Some Earlier Studies 
Over the years the Swedish forest commons have been the subject of a number of 
studies focusing on various aspects of their history, impact and achievements. The 
following is a summary of some of these studies.  
 
From the perspective of property rights and property regimes, Pettersson (2003) 
described the historical background and the process which saw the establishment 
of the modern forest commons. According to the author, their establishment was 
partly prompted by lessons learnt from the traditional type of commons known as 
“Häradsallmänningar”, which originated during the medieval period, or even 
earlier. The authorities and forest experts had limited confidence in the farmers’ 
ability to manage the forests properly. Maintaining the commons seemed 
preferable to parcelling out the land, with the proviso that the management should 
be supervised by the authorities and forest experts. Many politicians and officials 
were convinced that Swedish forests were in a precarious position, due to the 
increasing connection of Swedish farmers’ forests with the global market economy 
from the mid-19
th century onwards. Therefore, it was believed that strict 
management restrictions had to be imposed on the owners. At that time ‘good 
forest management’ was regarded as management that, with forward planning, 
provided high and reliable yields of timber for sale (Pettersson 2003). It was 
assumed that meeting these goals was likely to require the implementation of 
management plans and regimes drawn up and guided by those with expertise of 
larger-scale units than were being allocated to individual farmers (Pettersson 
2003). Under these circumstances, the new concept of Swedish forest commons 
was introduced and implemented in the areas that had still not been allocated i.e. 
in the counties of Kopparberg and Gävleborg, Västerbotten and Norrbotten. These 
‘modern’ forest commons were, in addition, ‘supposed to serve as an instrument 
for launching orderly forest management
6 by compelling the shareholders to 
follow the forest experts’ regulations’. Further, as Pettersson states, ‘good forest 
management involved forest management based on the principle of clear fellings 
and was focusing on raw material production for sale’ (Pettersson 2003, p.230).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Most of these are found in the counties of Kopparberg and Gävleborg.  
6 In the 19th century the regulation of forest husbandry resulted in the introduction of rotation forestry 
(trakthyggesbruk), as commonly practiced in Germany, based on clear fellings. The basic principle 
behind the new forest management strategy was both to regenerate the clear felled tracts and to ensure 
that harvesting did not exceed growth (Pettersson 2003).   14
Thus, in that sense they supported the concepts of modernization
7.  
 
Stenman (1983) discusses the forest commons in Västerbotten in his doctoral 
thesis. His starting point is their delimitation. Forest commons were established to 
serve as an example of improved forest management. He notes that the 
introduction of forest commons gave the authorities an opportunity to introduce 
new regulations aimed at reducing the risk of deforestation (Stenman 1983). The 
yields from the forest commons were intended to provide enduring support for the 
farms and it was assumed that speculative buying would be less likely if part of 
the forestland remained unallocated, so the entire forest was not distributed 
between the shareholders.  
 
In a thesis on the forest commons in Norrbotten, Liljenäs (1977, p.21) stresses that 
the ‘primary aim for the introduction of the Swedish forest commons was to 
provide a lasting support to the farming population’. Economic returns should be 
used first for silvicultural activities and thereafter to pay debts and taxes, for social 
welfare and other purposes benefiting the public. Another aim was to prevent the 
forest companies from acquiring the farmers’ forestland. According to Liljenäs 
(1977) the common forests are of considerable economic importance to the 
interior communes of Norrbotten. In the summary of her thesis, and in a later 
report (Liljenäs 1983), she also stresses the importance of forest commons in 
promoting lasting jobs within the forestry and agricultural sector in order to 
support the local population in the interior of Norrbotten, especially its remote 
areas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
7 From the 17
th century, the Swedish state sought to rationalize natural resource management. The 
strategy of rural modernization (cf. Van der Ploeg et. al., 2000) involved targeting maximum 
sustainable yield and strengthening rural services through economic growth. These ideas were later 
outlined in the Swedish Forestry Acts, the first of which was launched in 1903. They were intended to 
prevent future shortages of forest raw materials. The aim was to increase timber production in a lasting 
way through introducing regeneration regulations. A goal of the Swedish Forestry Act of 1923 was to 
protect  young forests. Regulations prescribing the minimum stand age for final felling were first 
introduced in 1918, and extended by the Swedish Forestry Act of 1948 to protect so-called vigorous 
forest from premature final felling (Enander 2003). The revision of the Swedish Forestry Act in 1948 
included a statute requiring an even output of timber over time and better silvicultural methods 
designed to increase productivity and thus raise economic returns from forest areas. Sustainability, 
profitability and social considerations were established as priority objectives. In the revised Swedish 
Forestry Act of 1993, production goals and conservation goals were given equal importance (Enander 
2000, 2001). Environmental concerns are today considered to be as important as wood production and 
the detailed regulation of intensive forestry has been replaced by increased responsibility for the forest 
owners (Kjellin 2001). For a detailed account of the development of environmental concerns, from 
nature conservation to bio-diversity, connected with forestry see Lisberg Jensen (2002).  
   15 
The report further suggests that, in the future, the distribution of revenues from the 
commons should be controlled by the authorities. Liljenäs also discusses the 
different approaches to the distribution of profits
8, and claims that profits going to 
established activities reduce the outflow of capital from the common forests to 
other parts of Sweden. Therefore a switch to cash payments would, according to 
Liljenäs (1977), be inappropriate for interior Norrbotten.  
 
In 1983, the Swedish Commission on Collectively-Owned Forestland published an 
official (Committee) report (Ministry of Agriculture 1983), one purpose of which 
was to examine the Forest Commons Law (SFS 1952:167). It focused on both 
regional development policy and forestry policy. The Commission concluded that 
the Swedish forest commons are ‘among the best managed forests in the country’. 
In addition, the Commission reported that annual cuttings in forest commons 
generally reached 100% of their approved management plans (Ministry of 
Agriculture 1983, p. 85)
9. The Commission, therefore, recommended that no 
change of forestry policy was required. However, with respect to regional 
development policy, a number of amendments were suggested including a new 
forest commons law (this proposal was later rejected).  
 
According to Carlsson (1995) the prime motive for allocating forest commons was 
to create larger and more productive units that could better meet the growing 
forest industry’s demand for raw materials. This would further balance the power 
of the forest companies. Second, it was considered important to strengthen 
individual farmers’ finances and, thus, the whole community’s economic status 
(Carlsson 1995). An additional aim, connected to this motive, was ‘to secure the 
existence of an independent class of farmers and thus to maintain political 
stability’ (Carlsson 1999, p.12).  
 
Carlsson has undertaken a number of studies on forest commons, examining them 
from an institutional perspective. The aim of a report from 1995 was to map and 
compare the Swedish forest commons with respect to institutional arrangements 
and to describe local differences in policies, determining how well they have 
adjusted to different local situations. He was especially concerned with property 
rights and how transaction costs for the various activities have been maintained at 
an acceptable level. The analysis and conclusions were based on the assumption 
that the forest commons are well managed, with higher yearly increments than 
fellings undertaken at the same time under competitive forest management regimes 
                                                 
8 The policy controlling the distribution of the dividend differs due to historical arrangements, and 
regional patterns can be discerned. According to the 1906 decree (SFS 1906b), the dividend in 
Västerbotten is paid to all shareholders as annual payments in proportion to the size of their share in the 
forest common (Stenman 1983). In most of the other forest commons the dividends are distributed 
among the shareholders as monetary subsidies for purposes benefiting agricultural development such as 
drainage and agricultural training, to forest development such as forest management plans and subsidies 
for plants or to public assistance measures such as sports arenas and road maintenance (Carlsson 1995, 
Liljenäs 1982) or as a combination of the two systems (Liljenäs 1982, 1983).  
9 Since the forest commons have been managed in accordance with the state’s intentions (Ministry of 
Agriculture 1983, p. 58, 67-68) and the Swedish Forest Act (SFS 1993), a logical interpretation of this 
statement is that the production capacity of the forest commons, in terms of timber harvesting, has been 
entirely fulfilled.    16
(cf. Carlsson 1995, Carlsson 1999)
10. However, he remarks that despite the 
toughness of the timber market the commons are competitive, but it is ‘puzzling’ 
that the shareholders harvest much less timber than they are allowed to. He 
suggested that this may be explained by the ‘target income hypothesis’ (1999 
p.18), since it could be a manifestation of a high degree of adaptability, or that the 
shareholders ‘have shown a high degree of innovation to reduce transaction costs’ 
(Carlsson 1999, p.22). Carlsson (1995) has also considered whether the forest 
commons have served as a model for the shareholders. The question addressed by 
Carlsson was whether being a shareholder influences the forest owner when 
managing their own private forestland. Carlsson (1995) found generally more 
activity among non-shareholders than shareholders both in Västerbotten and 
Norrbotten. In Norrbotten shareholders undertook the least activity of all. His 
results did not indicate that the forest common dividend promotes improved 
silviculture. Further, Carlsson noted that the payments from the forest commons 
seem to create a state of dependency with a negative effect on activity, especially 
if they are, as in Norrbotten, paid as subsidies.   
 
With respect to the aims of the Swedish Forest Commons and their achievements, 
different authors emphasise different aspects, but they do not contradict each 
other. A summary of all the goals and the means of achieving them that have been 
addressed by Liljenäs (1977, 1982, 1983), the Ministry of Agriculture (1983), 
Stenman (1983), Kardell (1991, 2004), Carlsson (1995, 1999, 2000, 2001), 
Ericsson (1997) and Pettersson (2003) is presented in Table 2.
 No ranking of their 
importance has been attempted, since the aims are closely interconnected.    
 
Table 2. The aims of the Swedish forest commons and advocated means for achieving them 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Carlsson refers, in this respect, to an evaluation made by the Swedish Commission on Collectively-
Owned Forestland (Ministry of Agriculture 1983) and to interviews he conducted, with the aim of 
surveying the institutional function of the Swedish forest commons. Representatives of the forest 
commons were interviewed, as well as staff at the National Board of Forestry, Regional Forestry 
Boards, District Forestry Boards, Lantmäteriet (which has the overall national responsibility for the 
Swedish cadastre) and County Administrative Boards (Carlsson 1995). 
 
Aims Means 
•  To serve as an instrument for improved 
forest management with the focus on 
increased and sustained timber 
production. 
•  To serve as an instrument for 
sustainable economic support for 
farmers and the local economy, also to 
provide a solid basis for taxation and 
to secure the continued existence of an 
independent class of farmers.  
 
•  By orderly, planned, scientifically based 
forest management facilitated by 
professional foresters, larger production 
units and the exercise of authority. 
•  By serving as a model for the farmers for 
management of their own forests. 
•  By providing employment.  
•  By preventing forest companies from 
acquiring the farmers’ forestland. 
•  By providing incentives to local 
agriculture and forestry. 
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Objectives, Research Design and Delimitation of 
the Thesis  
Complementing these previous studies, this thesis examines the influences of 
forest commons on forest condition, management and the local economy. More 
specifically the objectives were:  
 
•  To compare, regionally, the state of the forests in commons and under other 
property regimes.  
 
•  To compare forest common shareholders with non-shareholders, with respect 
to harvesting intensity and related business activities on their individually 
managed forest properties, also considering taxes paid to the local 
municipality.  
 
•  To discuss research findings in relation to the aims of the Swedish forest 
commons and, in a broader context, of forest common property regimes.  
 
Thus, the work includes two comparative studies, one in which all forest commons 
were included and the other based on a case study in the municipality of 
Storuman, where all NIPF owners were included. Each study has been presented 
in a separate paper (Papers I-II). 
 
In the first study (Paper I), which examined 4.8 million hectares of productive 
forestland in total (Figure 1), a comparison of forest condition between regions 
and different property regimes was undertaken. The second study (Paper II) was 
conducted using data from a single municipality – Storuman – with one of the 
largest forest commons in Sweden.  
 
 
 
Summary of the Papers 
(I) Forest Condition and Management in Swedish Forest 
Commons  
Introduction 
Any assessment of the outcome of the introduction of forest commons, from the 
perspective of use of natural resources, should be based on objective forest data. 
Therefore, a study was conducted using primary data from the Swedish National 
Forest Inventory. Such an assessment requires a comparison with other property 
regimes under similar biological conditions. As the institutional set-up differs 
amongst the forest commons, a regional comparison was also made.  
 
   18
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Map indicating the research areas considered in Papers I and II. Paper I examined 
municipalities with forest commons: the counties of Norrbotten (BD), Västerbotten (AC), 
Kopparberg (W) and Gävleborg (X).  The data presented in Paper II are related solely to 
Storuman - the municipality marked with a circle. The approximate location of the 
boundary between shareholders and non-shareholders areas is indicated with a line. 
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The objective of this study was to compare forest conditions between commons 
and other property regimes, regionally. Thus, in this study the forests were 
assessed and discussed in terms of site productivity, degree of maturity of the 
stands and standing volumes. The intentions were not only to determine the 
current status of the forest commons, but also to elucidate past management 
practices, i.e. actions taken (or not taken) by analysing the present forest 
condition. By sub-dividing the data it was hoped to determine any regional trends. 
This type of information is useful since, together with data on regional 
characteristics, it may help to explain differences in the success of the commons. 
Finally, the analysis sought to evaluate
11 whether the forest commons have 
achieved their management goals. 
 
Material and Methods  
The research focused on the forests comprising the Swedish forest commons and 
surrounding forests (Figure 1). Only municipalities with a forest common were 
included in the study. The data used in the study originate from the Swedish 
National Forest Inventory’s (NFI) database from the years 1998-2002.  
 
The forestland was divided into four owner categories: NIPF owners, company 
forests, forest commons and public forests. Public forests include State-owned 
forests and forests owned by other public institutions including churches, 
municipalities and public foundations. Company forests are those owned by joint-
stock companies, either private or public. A number of parameters were compared 
between the four owner categories as well as between and within the three 
counties and regions involved. The methodology allowed comparisons with sub-
divisions down to a regional level. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Generally, the mean site productivities were similar in the counties of Norrbotten 
and Västerbotten for all types of property regime studied. In the counties of 
Kopparberg and Gävleborg productivities were significantly higher. The mean site 
productivity in the two former counties was estimated to be between 2.29-2.84 
m
3/ha/year and in the latter 3.54-4.66 m
3/ha/year. The lowest values were found in 
forest commons of Västerbotten together with the Norrbotten public forests and 
Norrbotten NIPF. 
 
Norrbotten displayed, overall, the most even age distribution among the different 
types forest property regime of the three regions studied, and the Norrbotten forest 
commons exhibited the most even age distribution among the forest commons. A 
lack of medium-aged forest is apparent, particularly in Västerbotten, and its forest 
commons include a very small proportion of young forests. This implies that the 
Västerbotten forest commons have a very high proportion of old forests. The 
distribution of maturity classes provides more specific information on the potential 
                                                 
11  In this context ‘evaluate’ refers to an investigation of the outcomes of activities in 
relation to aims, using a rationalistic evaluation approach (cf. Lind 1979).   20
for final felling, thinning and other silvicultural activities. As shown in Table 3, 
there are large differences between property regimes in Norrbotten and 
Västerbotten, but smaller differences between the counties of Kopparberg and 
Gävleborg. Three-quarters of the forestland in the Västerbotten forest commons is 
estimated to be mature enough for final felling compared to 29% of the forestland 
belonging to forest companies in Västerbotten. 
 
Table 3. Fractions of forestland area with forest sufficiently mature for final felling, 
according to property regime and region, 1998-2002 (%, and 95% confidence interval) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standing volumes within each age class provide a better picture of forest condition 
and management practices than the overall mean standing volumes. In 
Västerbotten, forest commons have, with minor exceptions, lower standing 
volumes for each age class than all the other property regimes. Harvesting quotas 
for the period 1998-2000 indicate that considerably less than the annual increment 
was harvested in both Västerbotten and Norrbotten forest commons – even less 
than the amounts for 1975-80 and 1980-1993 presented by Carlsson (1995).  
 
The study reveals conclusively that the status of the forests in the Västerbotten 
forest commons differ not only from the surrounding forests in Västerbotten, but 
also from the other forest commons. Although the geographical conditions (site 
productivity, altitude, and proximity to high mountains) are somewhat less 
favorable for the forest commons in this area, this is not considered to significantly 
affect the outcome. This interpretation is based on the comparison with Norrbotten 
public forests and Norrbotten NIPF, which also have low mean site productivities, 
and in the case of the Norrbotten public forests large areas in close proximity to 
high mountains. These areas have a more even age structure than the Västerbotten 
forest commons. Similarly, the proportion of forests mature enough for final 
felling in Norrbotten, and their harvesting quotas, are closer to the norm. The 
results from the Västerbotten forest commons should be used to inform estimates 
of the production capacity of the forestland, considering mean site productivity, 
standing volumes within age classes, the distribution of age and maturity classes 
and harvesting quotas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Property regime  Norrbotten  Västerbotten  Kopparberg 
och 
Gävleborg 
Forest commons  38  ±  9  75 ± 11  42  ±  5 
Public forests  51  ±  8  63 ± 11  33  ±  4 
Company forests  27  ±  4  29 ± 7  34  ±  3 
NIPF  34  ±  5  51 ± 7  39  ±  4   21 
(II) Comparison of Harvesting and Business Activities of Non-
shareholders and Shareholders in a Forest Common in 
Västerbotten, Sweden  
Introduction 
Swedish forest commons are collectively owned and managed by shareholders 
who also own other forest holdings on an individual rather than a collective basis. 
The aim of this study was to assess differences between non-shareholders and 
shareholders, with respect to harvesting intensity on their individually managed 
forest properties, and related business activities. Forest commons are intended to 
promote local agriculture and forestry and to serve as a model for forestry 
activities (cf. Table 2). On this basis, the hypothesis examined in this study was 
that the shareholders’ harvesting and business activities, as well as their 
contributions to the local economy, should be more extensive than those of non-
shareholders. The contributions were assessed and discussed in terms of operating 
costs, investments, disposable income and direct tax revenue. 
 
In order to address the hypothesis, a comparative study was conducted of NIPF 
owners in the municipality of Storuman, where one of the largest forest commons 
is located. Besides the size of the forest common, the choice of Storuman was 
guided by the useful feature, in the context of this study, that there is a fairly 
balanced distribution of forestland between shareholders and non-shareholders 
within the municipality. Furthermore, only NIPF owners (private individuals) own 
shares in the forest common, while a significant proportion of most other forest 
commons is held by other types of shareholders.  
Material and Methods  
 
Material and Methods  
Storuman is a mountainous municipality in the County of Västerbotten, which 
contains 271 000 ha of productive forestland
12 (Regional Forestry Board of 
Västerbotten 2000). In 1918 about half of the farmers’ forestland in the western 
part of the municipality of Storuman was allocated for a forest common to be 
called the Tärna-Stensele forest common (TSA), while the other half was to be 
individually managed. At that time, the farmers in the eastern part of Storuman 
had already received their forestland, all of which was to be individually managed. 
NIPF ownership, including the Tärna-Stensele forest common (TSA), accounts for 
54 % of the forest area. The area that the shareholders manage individually 
amounts to 41 600 ha, and the area jointly managed (the TSA forest common) to 
38 400 ha. The area of non-shareholders’ forest is of the same magnitude; about 
65 000 ha (District Forestry Board of Storuman 2005a). 
 
The study involved a total of 1583 individuals, defined as NIPF owners, of which 
871 were residents within the municipality and 712 were not. Of the total 1583, 
                                                 
12 The forestland referred to throughout this study was productive land defined as ‘land suitable for 
wood production and not primarily used for other purposes and where the potential yield under ideal 
management conditions is at least 1 m
3 per hectare per year’ (SFS 1979, §2).   22
901 were shareholders in the TSA. NIPF owners included in the study were 
defined using the same data and method as employed by Holmgren et.  al. (2005). 
Secondary data from Statistics Sweden (SCB) for 2000 were used, including the 
Total Population Register (TPR), the Register of Real Estate Assessment (FTR), 
annual income tax returns and excerpts of accounting items from SCB business 
statistics (SCB 2003). With assistance from SCB, the TPR and the FTR were used 
to identify each individual who owned agricultural property within the 
municipality. Forest data were supplied by the District Forestry Board of 
Storuman (2005a-c) and the Regional Forestry Board of Västerbotten (2000). 
Using these data sources, a comparative assessment of shareholders and non-
shareholders of the TSA was based on the following: forestry production data, 
sales revenues, operating costs and investments, disposable income and local 
municipal tax revenues.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Based on the criteria applied in the sample selection, the shareholders and non-
shareholders should have similar potential to operate sustainable forestry across 
the municipality. Nevertheless, the shareholders displayed lower activity with 
respect to annual felling (m
3 over bark per hectare per year). In fact, the levels of 
felling on shareholders’ individually managed land were less than a third of the 
levels on non-shareholders’ land, and below the level that could be expected from 
land classified as productive forestland, i.e. forestland with the potential to 
produce more than 1 m
3 per hectare per year. This was unexpected, since only 
minor differences in average mean site productivities (0.2 m
3sk/ha/year: Table 4), 
to the disadvantage of the shareholders, were found. The differences in timber 
extraction between shareholders and non-shareholders were also verified by 
accounted sales revenues. Shareholders declared timber sales revenues of SEK 
214/ha (including dividend) and non-shareholders SEK 484/ha. 
 
Table 4. Standing and harvested volumes on non-industrial private forest (NIPF) owners’ 
land, including shareholders and non-shareholders, in the municipality of Storuman in 
2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Source; District Forestry Board of Storuman (2005a). 
2 Estimates based on final felling area in the year 2000 provided by the District Forestry Board of 
Storuman (2005c), an assumed average yield of 120 m
3sk/ha for final fellings and thinnings, assuming 
that final fellings account for about 88.5 % of the total fellings (Regional Forestry Board of 
Västerbotten 2000).  
3 Source; S.son-Wigren (2001) and the TSA management report for the year 2000. 
4  In total NIPF owners individually managed 106 600 ha (source; Regional Forestry Board of 
Västerbotten 2000). 
 
 
 
Forest category 
 
Mean site 
productivity 
(m
3sk/ha/y) 
Average 
standing 
volume  
(m
3sk/ha) 
Productive 
forestland 
(ha) 
Harvested 
volume total  
(m
3sk) 
Harvested 
volume per 
hectare 
(m
3sk/ha) 
NIPF non-
shareholders 2.7
1  66
1 65  000
4 118  603
2 1.83 
NIPF shareholders  2.5
1 67
1 41  600
4    22 088
2 0.53 
TSA forest common
3         2.5        58     38 400   21 000  0.55 
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In total, the accounted sales revenue amounted to SEK 37.6 million. The dividend 
from the TSA forest common, SEK 795 200 for the year 2000, was distributed to 
the shareholders as annual payments, so it was declared within the shareholders’ 
sales figures. Linking the timber sales revenue to the area of individually managed 
forestland, shareholders had sales values of 191 SEK/ha
13 after the dividend from 
TSA had been deducted. The non-shareholders revenues amounted 484 SEK/ha. 
Thus, the felling statistics (Table 4) and the declaration data are consistent, since 
both indicate lower activity among shareholders for the year under consideration.  
 
Differences were found also in harvesting behavior, in accordance with the 
findings of Carlsson (1995). The shareholders’ individually managed lands, as 
well as the TSA, displayed one pattern and the non-shareholders another (Table 
4). Thus, in this sense, it seems that the forest commons have served as role 
models for the shareholders. It also appears that the shareholders’ less intensively 
managed forestlands generate economic returns that are inferior to those of the 
non-shareholders’. In addition, the impact of the TSA (including the dividend) on 
shareholders’ individual results does not seem to help the shareholders to achieve 
a comparable level of economic return to the non-shareholders.  
 
The higher activity among non-shareholders generates more local tax revenue. In 
contrast, besides the local tax revenue, the tax system can be seen as an essential 
part of the institutional framework that the NIPF owner operates within. Non-
shareholders seem, with their higher activity and lower operational and investment 
costs, to have other incentives than the shareholders for their forest ownership. 
High costs for operation and investments can be considered positively from the 
perspective of the local society, assuming that the money is mainly spent within 
the municipality, thus stimulating local private enterprise and the public sector.  
 
 
 
Final Discussion and Conclusions 
In this thesis, the effects of the Swedish forest commons are assessed in terms of 
their influence on forest condition, management and the local economy. There are 
various ways to do this. Here, a rationalistic evaluation approach was chosen, 
focusing on the outcome of activities in relation to their aims (cf. Lind 1979). In 
the first study, this was done by examining how forest condition and management 
have been affected by the introduction of the forest commons. This was 
accomplished by studying all the forest commons, as well as other forest property 
regimes within the municipalities containing them. All data were sub-divided 
according to region. A second study compared forest common shareholders and 
non-shareholders, with respect to their harvesting intensity and related business 
activities on their individually managed forest properties.  
 
                                                 
13 The TSA forestland contributed, through the dividend, to the shareholders revenues of 21 SEK for 
each hectare of forest common land.     24
What, therefore, have been the effects of the Swedish forest commons on the 
variables considered in this thesis? Re-examining the results from the two studies 
(Papers I-II), we find that the aims of the forest commons have not, generally, 
been achieved. The condition of the forest commons in the counties of Kopparberg 
and Gävleborg is similar to that of the surrounding forests. From a timber 
production perspective, the forest commons of Norrbotten and Västerbotten have a 
less favourable status than the surrounding forests (Paper I). The case study (Paper 
II) demonstrated that, in comparison to NIPF non-shareholders in the same 
municipality, the NIPF shareholders in Storuman undertake less harvesting and 
fewer business activities on their individually managed land. Furthermore, the 
shareholders undertake a similar level of harvesting activities on their individually 
managed land as in the forest common. The impact of the TSA forest common 
(including the dividend) on shareholders’ individual finances does not seem to 
help them achieve a level of economic return comparable to that of the non-
shareholders. Comparing the economic outcomes from the shareholders’ two 
categories of forestland with non-shareholders’ individually managed forestland, 
shareholders appear to have been affected by, or have affected, the operations of 
the TSA. Further, since non-shareholders undertake more activity than 
shareholders, they also generate more local tax revenue.   
 
Since no evidence was found of any substantial biological differences between the 
different types of owners and property regimes in the potential to undertake 
forestry activities, these difference appear to be, at least partially, due to 
differences between the institutional frameworks in which they operate. These 
structures differ in the incentives associated with increased forest production, as 
well as in their effects on owners’ finances and the owners’ contributions to the 
local economy through taxes. The studies provide examples where the state of the 
forest in forest commons differs from that associated with other property regimes. 
They also show that there are regional differences within the institutional 
framework in which the forest commons operate. These differences are, in turn, 
likely to be linked to differences in regional characteristics that may contribute to 
variations in the forest commons’ success. Thus, there are factors connected to the 
different types of property regime (individual, forest commons, public forest or 
forest company property) and also factors connected to the regional differences.  
 
This supports the general conclusions presented by McKean (2000), who asserts 
that many factors probably affect the success of a forest common. The regional 
differences identified in the first study could be linked to regional characteristics 
influencing the success of the forest commons. These could coincide with the 
general characteristics described by Ostrom (1990) and McKean (2000), but there 
may also be more specific characteristics, such as local differences in how the 
dividend is distributed. 
 
The reliability of the observed differences depends on the quality of the data. In 
this respect, the use of NFI data, which allows sub-division down to the regional 
level, has many advantages: the data collection and handling procedures used by 
the NFI are established, scientific and standardized, providing objective data that 
have been collected in the same way for the whole research area. Furthermore,   25 
they allow significance levels to be calculated. Thus, the observed differences 
appear to be well established. 
 
The second study included the whole population of NIPF owners within one 
municipality and relied on data from two sources: official forestry data and data 
from annual income tax returns. The forestry data from this study could be 
considered less reliable than the forestry data in the first study. However, the 
results from the two different sources suggest the same patterns, thus supporting 
the conclusions. Furthermore, they are consistent with the findings of Carlsson 
(1995), who also identified higher levels of activity among non-shareholders than 
shareholders in both Västerbotten and Norrbotten.  
 
A key issue raised by the results is why some of the Swedish forest commons do 
not meet their aims. Berge (2003) argues that the commons represent an 
appropriate institutional system, if the desired outcome focuses on shared benefits, 
if there is a need to solve collective action problems and to establish synergies 
between primary production and other rural activities. The system is also 
appropriate if there is a desire to exclude potential appropriators, or to provide a 
‘safety net’ for the poor and for subsequent generations. However, none of the 
aims considered in this thesis appear to be fulfilled. Like Berge (2003) and Ostrom 
(2000), we can conclude that holding property rights collectively is less effective 
than individual management for fulfilling these aims. The results presented in this 
thesis confirm this theory. 
 
An additional difficulty in the case of Swedish forest commons could be that, in 
contrast to many commons worldwide, they are owned in common and not jointly. 
This means that the number of owners tends to grow proportionally to the growth 
of the population, as long as the properties are inherited by all of the children of 
each generation of owners; a factor that according to Olson (1965) adversely 
affects their success. Further, the proportion of non-resident owners tends to keep 
pace with migration from these rural areas, another factor that might have a 
negative impact, at least from the local perspective. 
 
Another possible explanation for the observed performance of forest commons 
may be related to factors other than those studied in this thesis; their owners may 
have chosen or been forced to concentrate on aims that compete with timber 
production Some of the initiatives that have prompted a shift in the forest 
commons’ aims may have originated from the owners’ themselves, but many 
others may have arisen from other sources within their communities, e.g. pressure 
groups seeking to promote reindeer husbandry, hunting, fishing, tourism, 
biodiversity and conservation (Paper I). Of course, the owners’ interests and those 
of such pressure groups may also heavily overlap. These demands and 
expectations appear to be higher on the forest commons than on the individually 
managed land, even if the owners in many cases are the same private individuals 
(c.f. S.son-Wigren and Sandström 2001a, 2001b, Lisberg Jensen 2002). These 
considerations raise questions about whether the changed property rights have led 
to a lack of clarity regarding whose interests should dominate: those of the general 
population or the shareholders?    26
A different research approach could have examined many other aspects of 
Swedish forest commons, since the forests should not be considered a source of 
just one commodity. It would, for example, be interesting to study the contribution 
of the forest commons to local well-being, a sense of place and the ecological or 
amenity services they provide, their importance for the reindeer industry or the 
occurrence and importance of berries, fish and game and, possibly, their 
relationship to other types property regime. Many such aspects could be 
considered. However, as long as producing timber for sale is a stated aim for the 
management of the forest commons their influence of on timber production cannot 
be ignored in any analysis of their success, especially given the emphasis on 
timber production in earlier research and its importance for the Swedish economy. 
 
Uses other than timber production certainly have relevance for any future research 
agenda relating to forest commons. Today, general expectations regarding the 
services forest commons can deliver differ from the expectations when they were 
created. Several of the non-timber aspects that are now highly relevant meet 
criteria described by Berge (2003), such as shared benefits, collective action 
problems and excluding appropriators. A viable hypothesis, in this context, is that 
the Swedish forest commons could be more effective than individual management; 
and perhaps even more so now than in the timber production era. Thus, more 
research should be conducted to examine how efficient the Swedish forest 
commons have been with respect to these goals.  
 
Thus, we find that it is important to match the property regime to the intended 
outputs. In addition, there are local characteristics that should be considered before 
forest commons are established. These specific characteristics, in the case of 
Swedish forest commons, are still to be identified.   
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